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Abstract 
This paper considers whether listed companies with dispersed ownership invest less in 
training than do other firms, as part of a short-termist stance caused by pressure from 
the stock market. An analytical framework that supports the proposition involves 
three factors: high agency costs between the shareholders and managers of listed firms 
that have dispersed ownership; the use of highly geared performance-related pay to 
reward top managers; and accounting conventions that distort performance measures 
by requiring that spending on intangible assets be expensed not amortised. Managers 
then have the incentive and ability to restrict spending on training in order to increase 
their remuneration. Countervailing factors, including institutions of corporate 
governance, may however weaken or destroy such effects. Evidence is presented 
concerning the initial training programmes of 56 companies in engineering and 
retailing in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. The evidence is consistent with 
ownership effects in both sectors, but those effects are at most moderate in both 
incidence and strength. The skill requirements of competitive success in product 
markets appear more important than ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
The possibility that a company’s finance and ownership affect its decisions 
concerning skills and training has been extensively discussed by institutionally-
oriented social scientists. ‘Shareholder’ firms are contrasted to ‘stakeholder’ ones, in 
terms of their orientation to the interests of shareholders as opposed to those of 
employees, customers, and suppliers.1 In the related dichotomy between ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ and continental European ways of organising business, national systems of 
corporate ownership, finance and governance, on the one side, and skill development, 
on the other, differ between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies.2 
Shareholder-oriented firms may invest less in employee skills than do 
stakeholder-oriented ones as part of a short-termism caused by their greater exposure 
to the stock market. Evidence that the stock market pressures associated with 
dispersed ownership have economic drawbacks comes from the positive association 
between the leading form of ownership concentration – family control – and 
profitability among large listed firms in the US – although the contribution of family 
control to productivity depends on the employment of non-family members as 
managers.3 
Several mechanisms potentially link dispersed ownership to training. First, 
inefficiently high discount rates may be required in order to raise external equity, 
penalising long-term investment projects in general, and costly training programmes 
in particular.4 Second, the use of performance-related pay to reward corporate 
managers may reduce longer-term investment by encouraging them to spend less, in 
order to change reported earnings to their own advantage. The problem potentially 
focuses on listed companies with dispersed ownership, in which agency problems 
between shareho lders and managers are expected to be most severe, and in which the 
accounting scandals of the early 2000s were concentrated.5 Finally, accounting 
conventions, which require that spending on intangible assets be fully expensed rather 
than amortised, may prevent companies from showing the stock market the benefits of 
                                                 
1 E.g. Armour et al (2003), Solomon (2010). 
2 E.g. Mayer (1997), Porter (1998), Hall and Soskice (2001). 
3 Anderson and Reeb (2003), Bloom and van Reenen (2007). 
4 Miles (1995). 
5 Healy and Wahlen (1999), Coffee (2005). 
 
 
2 
such spending, which includes training alongside R&D and advertising. 6 The 
combined effect of these factors is likely to be particularly marked when the training 
in question is potentially expensive to the employer, as in the case of apprenticeship 
training for highly skilled occupations. 
There is considerable evidence on these three factors, but their interaction and 
combined effect on training remain unclear. Data that cover simultaneously both 
ownership and training across plants and companies are not readily available. This 
paper uses fieldwork for insights into these issues. Evidence is taken primarily from 
interviews with senior managers in 56 establishments in two sectors – engineering and 
retailing – in three countries – Britain, Germany and Switzerland – part of a wider 
project whose primary concern is pay structure and training. These three countries 
were chosen because of differences in national training methods, institutions of pay 
setting, and corporate ownership, as well as differing national expertise within the 
research team. Engineering and retailing were chosen as representing opposite poles 
in the national distributions of skill requirements and training methods.7 
Establishments were selected, where possible, to match them by product line, 
while differentiating them by corporate ownership and finance. Evidence was found 
consistent with selective ownership effects on training volume within engineering, 
along with cases in which financial upheaval has led a company to reduce training. 
These effects are however not widespread, and most interviewees see product market 
competition as a more powerful influence on their training decisions than are 
ownership and finance – as might indeed be expected from an economic standpoint. 
Section two discusses the potential association between corporate finance and 
initial training, including evidence from the US. The attributes of corporate ownership 
and initial training in the three countries are presented in section three. Section four 
outlines the data and research methods. Section five analyses our evidence and the  
conclusions follow in section six. 
2. Corporate ownership and training 
Why might one company be expected to invest less in training than an otherwise 
similar company because of differences in their ownership and finance? The answer 
potentially involves three factors: agency costs between owners and managers, 
                                                 
6 Green et al (1996), Konzelmann et al (2006). 
7 Ryan et al (2010). 
 
 
3 
performance-related pay for managers, and accounting conventions. A simplified 
statement of the hypothesis is that the owners of firms with a stock market listing and 
dispersed ownership typically use performance-based bonuses to reward top 
managers, and that accounting practices mean that these bonus systems perversely 
encourage managers to restrict spending on training in order to increase their own 
bonuses. This section discusses these factors with reference to the extensive evidence 
available for the US. 
The three factors taken together provide a particular explanation of ‘short-
termism’ – i.e. willingness to sacrifice longer-term benefit for short-term advantage 
when it is economically inefficient to do so. Some analyses of short-termism apply to 
corporate investment as a whole: e.g. the view of stock markets as systematically 
discounting a company’s future revenues at a higher rate than is warranted by the 
general cost of capital and a sector-specific risk premium.8 If that kind of short-
termism is present, all long-term investment, in fixed assets as well as intangibles, is 
sub-optimal. This paper’s analysis of short-termism is more narrowly focused. It 
applies specifically to investment in intangible assets by listed companies with 
dispersed ownership. 
Agency costs and ownership structure 
The starting point is the classic principal-agent problem between the owners and 
managers of large businesses. Listed firms with dispersed ownership involve conflicts 
of interest between owners (shareholders) and managers, as part of the divorce 
between ownership and control. Owners are assumed to want the firm to maximise 
profits (shareholder value); managers, to maximise their own utility, which is assumed 
to be the same as their income. The two parties’ goals potentially conflict: e.g. if pay 
increases with the size of the firm, managers have an incentive to make acquisitions 
that increase sales, even when making a takeover can be expected to reduce profits. 
Assuming asymmetric information, owners are unable to observe managers’ choices 
of action, which gives managers scope to pursue their own goals rather than those of 
owners. 
Managers might still be induced to pursue owners’ interests by the external 
monitoring of their decisions. The task could in principle be performed directly by 
owners themselves. In unlisted companies and closely held listed ones, the dominant 
                                                 
8 Miles (1995). 
 
 
4 
or sole owner has both the incentive and the position to do the monitoring. However, 
when there are many owners, none of them has much incentive to monitor managers’ 
decisions, as only a small share of the benefits will accrue to the one who bears the 
cost. 
The task of monitoring managers in the interest of shareholders belongs 
formally to the board of directors. Managers are however often seen to dominate the 
board, in terms of membership, agenda, and information. A second potential curb on 
managerial independence is the market for corporate control. Managers who pursue 
their own interests at the expense of owners risk provoking a hostile takeover bid, 
with their employment and perks at risk if it succeeds. They may though be able to 
deter hostile bids, by using special share issues, poison pills and the like. In practice, 
if neither the board of directors nor the takeover threat provides a serious constraint, 
given asymmetric information, listed companies with dispersed ownership are 
expected to exhibit managerial entrenchment.9 
Management remuneration 
In such cases, a further option for reducing goal divergence between owners and 
managers under dispersed ownership is performance-related pay: tying managers’ 
remuneration to one or more indicators of their success in promoting owners’ 
interests. When bonuses are geared sufficiently strongly to the firm’s performance, 
self- interest should induce managers to try to maximise performance. The potential 
performance indicators are both accounting-based (reported profits) and market-based 
(share price). 
In large US companies, managers typically have complex remuneration 
packages, comprising base pay, bonuses depending on short-term (current year) and 
medium-term (three to five year) reported profits (e.g. earnings per share, return on 
capital), and stock options, whose value depends on the firm’s share price. In the 
1990s, stock options came to dominate the remuneration of chief executives.10 The 
                                                 
9 Concerns about conflicts of interest in closely held companies focus on those between the dominant 
owner and minority shareholders, which carry no direct implications for skills and training (Morck et al 
2005, Enriques and Volpin 2007). 
10 Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005). The share of stock options in the total remuneration of top executives 
in the US rose from one per cent in 1984 to around two-thirds in the bubble economy of 2001 (Coffee 
2005: Figure 2). 
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gearing of bonuses and options to performance indicators, particularly the firm’s share 
price, is particularly strong in dispersed ownership firms.11 
The performance criteria used in management bonus systems focus mostly on 
short-term indicators, such as reported earnings per share in the current year and the 
share price at the end of the year. To that extent, managers are incentivised to increase 
short-term performance even when that comes at the expense of long-term 
performance.12 
Accounting conventions 
The third factor is the scope given by accounting practices to top managers to 
manipulate reported profits, and to raise the company’s share price, so as to increase 
their pay. The issue is that ‘generally accepted accounting principles ... do not always 
reflect firm value on a timely basis’.13 
Earnings may be managed along two routes. The first is the treatment of 
accruals in the firm’s profit and loss statement, i.e. the adjustment of cash flow to 
allow for the non- instantaneous depreciation of assets, the value of contracts for future 
sales, etc. By booking anticipated revenues early and current expenses late, given cash 
flow, managers can increase reported profits in the current accounting period. 
Accruals-based earnings management, long prominent, became widespread among 
listed companies in the US during the early 2000s. In the extreme cases, which 
became household names, notably Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, it led to bankruptcy 
and prosecution for securities fraud.14 It occurs more frequently and on a large scale in 
companies that gear bonus pay strongly to performance indicators in general, and 
those with high ‘option sensitivity’ in particular.15 
The second type of earnings management is the manipulation of real activities, 
which alters reported profits by changing cash flows.16 The focus is spending on 
internally generated intangible assets, notably research and development, advertising, 
                                                 
11 Murphy (1999), Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), Coffee (2005), Monks and Minow (2008: 310). 
Other components of remuneration include pension rights. 
12 Jensen and Murphy (2004). Murphy (1999) notes that although top managers’ pay depends more on 
the share price than on accounting profits, the dependence of the former on the latter encourages 
managers to focus their efforts on the latter. 
13 Dechow and Sloan (1991: 53). 
14 Healy (1985), Healy and Wahlen (1999). Accounting irregularities at WorldCom included the 
treatment of operating costs as investments, amortised across several years instead of expensed in full 
(Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). 
15 Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), Denis  et al (2006), Chen et al (2010). 
16 Dechow and Sloan (1991), Roychowdury (2006). 
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and employee training. Standard accounting conventions require companies to 
expense such spending fully on current account, i.e. treat it as an operating cost, rather 
than to amortise it, i.e. treat it as an investment on capital account, to be depreciated 
across more than one period and included as an asset in the balance sheet, as for 
spending on plant and equipment. The convention reflects a key attribute of 
intangibles: the difficulty of valuing the asset. Training involves exceptional 
measurement difficulty, given that the costs of on-the-job training are difficult to 
separate from those of production. There is also the absence of unambiguous 
ownership by the company of the resulting asset, which remains, de jure at least, the 
property of the employee, and which the company would therefore have write off 
were spending on it capitalised and were the employee to quit.17 
These accounting conventions mean that, other things constant, a company that 
cuts spending on intangible assets reports higher profits in the same accounting period 
without changing its balance sheet substantially. Managerial remuneration then rises 
along three routes. First, higher reported earnings increase short-term bonuses. 
Second, to the extent that external investors rely on current accounting profits to value 
companies, the firm’s share price rises, and with it the value of managers’ stock 
options, which, if vested, can be sold at an inflated price. Third, the  probability of 
hostile takeover, leading to job loss for top managers, falls. Managers can therefore 
gain by holding down spending on intangibles, particularly those with low external 
visibility, including training.18 
Evidence on the manipulation of real activities mostly concerns R&D, 
spending on which is relatively easy to measure and audit – for researchers and 
external investors alike. US listed companies who do R&D are seen to reduce 
spending in particular situations. One is a potential fall in earnings per share, e.g. as a 
result of the award of stock options to top managers themselves. Another is when a 
                                                 
17 Roberts (2007). Recognition of intangibles as assets is generally confined to externally acquired 
ones, such as goodwill purchased in a takeover, and professional footballers purchased from another 
club (Benedict and Elliott 2008, Atrill and McLancy 2008).  Proponents of ‘human resource 
accounting’, in advocating the capitalisation of spending on employee skills (Flamholtz 1999), 
implicitly give validity priority over reliability as criteria for choice of accounting practice. 
18 According to one influential account of standard practice in American companies, ‘... important 
investments such as R&D, advertising or market entry are often not treated as capital investments at all; 
rather they are negotiated as part of the annual budgeting process, which is driven by a concern for 
current profitability’ and ‘intangible investments such as training may not even be tracked by the 
financial system and fall prey to deferral in the name of increasing near-term profits’ (Porter 1997: 11). 
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chief executive with highly geared bonuses or large stock options is about to retire.19 
Moreover, chief financial officers state candidly that they would and do change 
expenditure on real activities, notably R&D, in order to increase current earnings, 
when that would allow the company to cross an earnings threshold, such as breaking 
even, even when doing so would mean ‘burning economic value’ (i.e. reducing future 
profits).20 
Interactions 
The interaction of payment systems and accounting conventions may therefore 
constrain spending on training in companies with dispersed ownership. The three 
factors are complements. Indeed, all must be present for the result to hold. When the 
agency problem is weak or absent, as in firms with a dominant owner, self-serving 
management decisions are more readily observed and blocked by the owner, and in 
any event, reported results are less central to owners’ assessments of the firm’s value 
and managers’ performance. And when managers do not have access to high-powered 
bonus pay, there is less incentive to crank up reported profits in the first place. 
The three factors may not however suffice to prevent economically beneficial 
spending on training. First, even when all three are present, the interests of top 
managers may not be uniformly short-termist. While a chief executive holding large 
stock options and approaching retirement has clear incentives to short-termism, others 
may be more interested in job security, and anticipate that an earnings restatement and 
damage to their careers will follow from any serious manipulation of earnings.21 Such 
managers may concentrate on smoothing fluctuations in reported earnings, e.g. by 
creating ‘cookie jars’ (concealed reserves). The tendency of stock markets to prize 
stability in reported performance encourages this kind of earnings management, which 
                                                 
19 Bens et al (2003); Dechow and Sloan (1991). In the 1980s a high-tech company, Analytic Devices, 
spun off its R&D into a separate company in order to avoid the effects of its high outlays on its share 
price – but did so only until changes in accounting standards removed that option (Stein 1989). 
20 Indeed, CFOs state that they prefer to manage earnings through real activities than through accruals, 
given that the former is not subject to intervention by the firm’s auditors (Graham et al 2005). Other 
actions by which managers are seen to raise current reported profits include cutting product prices, 
producing surplus inventory, and deferring the maintenance of plant and equipment (Roychowdury 
2006). There is also evidence of earnings management within multi-plant companies. Head offices 
typically give the managers of subsidiary units financial targets, and evaluate their performance in 
relation to those targets. Given that, subordinate managers tend to raise their bonuses by way of 
dis torted inventory valuations, which are particularly difficult for head office to monitor (Guidry  et al 
1999). 
21 Coffee (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006). 
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appears to predominate in block-holder and unlisted firms.22 Its implications for 
training may be more severe, however: longer-term restriction of spending replaces 
short-term restriction, given that benefit to top managers in the short-term of any 
temporary cut in training must be set against lower subsequent profits.23 
Second, one or more of the three factors may be weak or absent, thereby short-
circuiting the incentive to managers to hold down spending on intangibles. Strong 
corporate governance and investor activism may enhance owners’ monitoring of 
management decisions.24 Shareholder representatives may oppose the use of highly 
geared bonuses and stock options, in order to reduce short-termist side effects. 
Finally, external investors, including fund managers and analysts, have the incentive 
to look behind current financial statements to judge the company’s value, thereby 
making the share price less sensitive to earnings manipulation. The last of these three 
constraints on managerial short-termism clearly matters in practice. Companies that 
spend highly on research and training have high ratios of market to book value.25 
Companies’ share prices typically increase when the firm announces increased 
spending on R&D, even when that is accompanied by a fall in reported earnings.26 
Moreover, contemporary changes in corporate law, regulation and practice 
have, in the US and the UK in particular, been aimed at all three aspects of managerial 
entrenchment in companies with dispersed ownership. Enhanced powers for boards of 
directors, along with increased autonomy from management, aim at improving 
owners’ ability to monitor managers’ decisions. The use of stock options to reward 
                                                 
22 Leuz and Wüsterman (2004). See section 3, below. 
23 Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Chung et al (2002). The relative importance of the two motives for 
earnings management is contested (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The two motives may be seen as partly 
substitutes, insofar as higher current earnings are obtained at the expense of lower future earnings, but 
also as partly complements, in the views of chief financial officers at least, who prefer a share price that 
is high as well as stable (Graham et al 2005). 
24 The effects on managerial short-termism of the long-term increase in the importance of institutional 
investors remains controversial. Some commentators see it as having increased short-termism, 
associated with high turnover in pursuit of rapid capital gains in the portfolios of many funds, 
particularly hedge funds, and with the willingness of fund managers to support hostile bids in failing 
companies rather than intervene to improve management, again in pursuit of near-term capital gains 
(Porter 1998, Jacoby 2009). Others see it as reducing short-termism, insofar as the increasing use of 
indexing strategies by investment funds, the growth of active investment funds, and the long-term 
horizons of pension funds in particular, encourage long-term holdings of particular companies’ shares 
(e.g. Monks and Minow 2009). The former, pessimistic view is supported by evidence that companies 
that are formally charged with securities fraud have significantly larger ownership shares for 
institutional investors, as well as more highly geared stock options for managers, than other firms 
(Denis  et al 2006). 
25 Flamholtz (1999). 
26 Chan et al (1990). In Britain, the market valuation of companies that do R&D increases with 
spending on R&D (Green et al 1996). 
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top managers has been reined in following the scandals of the early 2000s. British 
companies are now encouraged to supplement financial reporting with narrative 
reporting, including information on changes in skills and training, so as to improve 
investors’ information. 27 
Finally, there is evidence of earnings management even in unlisted US 
companies, associated with owners’ wishes to assure their creditors of the company’s 
health, and to facilitate any future flotation on the stock market.28 This complication 
spreads the scope of constraints on training across the corporate spectrum, weakening 
the distinction between listed companies and private companies, and making it more 
difficult to establish the effects of accounting conventions on training. 
The question however is not whether the three constraints are present but 
whether they are strong enough to remove the postulated link between ownership and 
training. The enduring limits to the power of boards and activist investors to control 
managers are widely recognised.29 The reining in of stock options has not meant the 
end of highly geared performance-related pay for senior managers.30 Even though 
external investors see beyond reported earnings in valuing companies, their vision 
may still not be sharp enough to remove the benefit to managers of earnings 
management.31 Indeed, most chief financial officers in large US companies see the 
stock market as focused more on reported earnings than on cash flow, and as 
punishing severely any fall in, or any failure to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts of, 
reported earnings.32 
The incentive to the managers of companies with dispersed ownership to hold 
down spending on intangibles should be particularly marked for training, given its low 
measurability and external visibility, and particularly for apprentice training in 
occupations in which its cost to the employer is high and alternative sources of skill, 
notably recruitment and upgrade training, are also costly. 33 
Evidence on the association between ownership and training is however sparse. 
A study of the links between HRM practices and corporate ownership across British 
                                                 
27 Monks and Minow (2008: chapter 2), Ferrarini and Moloney (2005), DTI (2003), ASB (2006). 
28 Graham et al (2005). 
29 Cheffins (2008), Cheffins and Bank (2009). 
30 Ferrarini and Moloney (2005). 
31 Narrative reporting has yet to realise in Britain the hopes attached to it, not least because of the 
limited informational content of the Key Performance Indicators that companies report annually (ASB 
2009). 
32 Graham et al (2005). 
33 Ryan et al (2007), Bellmann and Janik (2007). 
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workplaces found no significant relationship.34 Countries with larger equity markets 
have significantly smaller systems of initial vocational training.35 The paucity of prior 
evidence on the issue provides one motive for this study. 
3. Attributes of Ownership and Training in Three Countries 
This section outlines the similarities and differences between the three countries, in 
terms of, first, the three factors discussed in the previous section and, second, the 
relevant county-sector’s initial training system.36 
Table 1. Indicators of stock market size and activity, 2002 
 Stock market 
capitalisationa as % of 
gross domestic 
product 
New issues as % of 
gross fixed capital 
formation 
Turnover velocity: 
annual sales as % of 
market capitalisation 
GB 111.0 12.6 097.3 
DE 031.2 00.0 125.1 
CH 183.1 00.0 138.6 
 
Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2003 
Notes: 
a. Includes all shares in the domestically owned and some foreign owned (i.e., those not listed also in 
another country) companies that are listed in any of the country’s stock markets 
 
A leading contextual attribute is the importance of the stock market within the 
economy as a whole. Here the three countries differ sharply but unevenly. In terms of 
capitalisation, the stock market plays a small role in Germany, and a very large one in 
Switzerland, with Britain in between. It makes no ne t contribution to capital formation 
in Germany or Switzerland, and only a moderate one in Britain. Finally, although one 
                                                 
34 Konzelmann et al (2006). The lack of association may reflect the limitations of the data used, notably 
the lack of differentiation of dispersed from blockholder ownership among listed companies, and the 
orientation of the training variables to adult training (incidence of and time spent in off-the-job training, 
and HR content of training). 
35 Black et al (2007). These results are hard to interpret because of the inclusion of full-time vocational 
schooling alongside apprenticeship in the dependent variable, and limited controls for other national 
attributes. 
36 Further evidence could be drawn from research on national institutions and economic performance. 
Thus ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ market economies can be differentiated in terms of ‘patient’ and 
‘impatient’ capital respectively, with associated differences in innovation, skills and training (De Jong 
1997, Hall and Soskice 2001, Streeck and Yamamura 2001, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2002). 
Differences in capital markets and corporate governance feature in such analyses (Vitols 2001, Höpner 
and Jackson 2006). The contribution of those studies to this paper’s topic and methods is however 
limited by their emphasis on complementarities between capital markets, corporate governance and 
labour management (Höpner 2005) and on cross-national rather than intra-national variation in 
corporate finance and governance (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005, Cheffins and Bank 2009). 
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might expect turnover velocity in share ownership – a potential indicator of short-
termism by investors – to be highest in Britain, it is markedly lower there than in the 
other two countries (Table 1). These data suggest an important role for listed 
companies with short-term oriented owners in both Britain and Switzerland, alongside 
a smaller-scale version of that in Germany. 
Corporate ownership, payment systems and accounting practice 
The previous section discussed the conditions under which companies with dispersed 
ownership can be expected to do less training than other companies. The evidence 
cited refers largely to the US. Even if those conditions apply there, they may not in 
Europe – as for example were the culture of American management radically different 
from its European counterparts. Moreover, even if they do apply to Europe, their 
importance may differ from country to country – as were management practice closer 
to its American counterpart in Britain than in Germany. 
Corporate ownership and finance 
Although the importance of dispersed ownership, and with it the ‘managerial’ firm, 
remains disputed, even for the US,37 it clearly features prominently there, and also in 
the three countries studied here. On a standard criterion (no single shareholder owns 
20 per cent or more of the voting rights), among the largest 20 listed companies in the 
country in 1995, all the British ones had dispersed ownership, as did one half or more 
in Germany and Switzerland (50 and 60 per cent, respectively). Taking all listed (non-
financial) companies, during 1996-99 the share of dispersed ownership, on the same 
criterion, was lower in all three countries, at 64 per cent in Britain, 26 per cent in 
Switzerland, and only 10 per cent in Germany, but the national differences remain 
marked. The difference between Britain and Germany in the prevalence of dispersed 
ownership was particularly large. In 1995, 83 per cent of listed British companies but 
only 17 per cent of German ones had no dominant owner.38 
                                                 
37 Berle and Means (1932), Hannah (2007), Cheffins and Bank (2009). See also Morck et al (2005), 
Enriques and Volpin (2007). 
38 La Porta et al (1999: 492), Faccio and Lang (2002: 380), Barca and Becht (2001: Figures 1.9, 1.14). 
The difference between Germany and Britain is overstated by the latter data, as the German sample 
comprises only the 30 largest among the 436 firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (DAX), 
whereas the British one comprises (a random sample of) all firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
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The other side of the coin is that companies with a dominant owner also 
feature in all three countries, particularly in Germany. The leading variant within the 
category, family firms, accounted in 1996-99 for 25 per cent of listed firms in Britain, 
as compared to 56 per cent in Switzerland and 69 per cent in Germany. 39 Painting the 
full picture would require the inclusion of unlisted firms, most of which are owned 
entirely by a single individual or family, and which are particularly prominent in 
Germany. 40 The share of unlisted firms in headcounts of all businesses is high in all 
three countries (Appendix: Table A5). On an employment or turnover basis, however, 
the share of listed firms would be much higher in all countries, as such firms are 
mostly medium-sized or large. In Switzerland, for example, listed firms account for 
nearly one-fifth of corporate turnover (Table A6).41 
The pressure that the stock market exerts on firms depends also on national 
business law and accounting practice. One potentially important factor is the degree to 
which incumbent management is protected in listed firms from hostile takeover bids. 
Differences between Britain and Germany were traditionally large here. The City 
Code of Practice governing takeover bids in Britain makes it difficult for managers to 
ward off a hostile bid, whereas until the last decade hostile takeovers were very rare in 
Germany, associated with the extensive roles played by bank finance, pyramid 
shareholdings, multiple control chains, cross-holdings, and non-voting shares. Such 
devices feature less commonly in Switzerland, despite considerable legal scope for 
their adoption. Moreover, Germany’s two-tier board system and the presence of 
Works Councils in larger establishments impede further the acquisition of control 
over a target company. 42 
Differences between the three countries have declined in the past decade, with 
the expanded regulation of takeovers and the growth of merger activity in both 
Germany and Switzerland.43 At the same time, the managers of listed British firms, 
like their American counterparts, can be taken to be more exposed to a hostile 
                                                 
39 Barca and Becht (2001). 
40 More than three-quarters of British unlisted companies were entirely owned by an individual in 1996; 
in the remainder, an individual owned at least one half (Goergen and Renneboog 2001: 275-6). See 
Noack and Zetzsche (2005) concerning Germany. 
41 Among listed Swiss firms, dispersed ownership, which applies to one half of the largest firms 
(above), accounts for only around one quarter of medium sized and small ones. Differences in the share 
of dispersed ownership by firm size are similarly large in Germany and in Britain (Faccio and Lang 
2002: Table 5). 
42 Faccio and Lang (2002: Table 7), FBD (2006, 2009), Lambert  et al (2010). 
43 Höpner (2003), Höpner and Jackson (2006). FBD (2009: Appendix 2) reports 33 takeover bids by 
large German firms during 2005-07 alone. 
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takeover bid than are their (less numerous) counterparts in Germany and Switzerland. 
Their interest in keeping their company’s share price high in order to discourage 
hostile bids should be correspondingly greater. 
Managerial remuneration 
The availability of cross-national evidence on payment systems for top managers is 
restricted by weaker disclosure requirements for listed companies in Germany than in 
Britain. One clear difference is a lesser use of stock options in Germany than in 
Britain. Among the large companies in the Eurotop 300 index in 2001, all of the 
British ones but only 57 per cent of the German ones give stock options to their top 
managers. More generally, differences in the importance of variable pay in listed 
companies appear to be closely associated with the importance among listed firms of 
dispersed ownership relative to block-holder ownership – though the data on which 
that conclusion is based appear scanty. 44 Even less is known about the structure of 
management pay in unlisted firms in all countries. 
Differences between Britain and Germany have declined in the  past decade, 
with the growth of incentive pay in Germany, where the use of stock options was 
legally prohibited until 1998, and the move from stock options to long-term incentive 
bonuses in Britain, following the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. Little 
information is available on these attributes in Swiss companies. 
Accounting practice 
Finally, accounting practices have traditionally been similar in the UK and the US, 
while both have differed from continental European methods, in association with 
wider differences between common law and code law systems. ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
accounting conventions serve primarily the needs of external, arms- length investors; 
continental ones, the needs of stakeholders, in particular large shareholders, banks, 
and employee representatives, whose ‘insider’ status reduces the importance of 
published accounts – in Germany relative in particular to the audit statement, which is 
circulated internally but not published. 
Less stringent reporting requirements appear however to be associated in 
German and Swiss listed firms with more extensive earnings management than in 
                                                 
44 Ferrarini et al (2003), Ferrarini and Moloney (2005). An anomalous finding in the former study is 
that variable pay (excluding stock options) amounted to 53 per cent of the total remuneration of 
Management Board members in Germany, but only 33 and 31 per cent of the pay of CEOs and other 
executives, respectively, in Britain. 
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British and US ones, at least in terms of the handling of accruals to smooth income 
and avoid reporting a loss.45 It is not clear whether similar cross-national differences 
apply also to the manipulation of real activities, including training, or to unlisted 
firms. In any event, this evidence suggests that the analysis in the previous section is 
potentially relevant to listed firms in all three countries.46 
Moreover, differences in national accounting systems have declined in recent 
years, with the dissemination of International Financial Reporting Standards, and 
German legislation that has installed many of the investor protection practices used in 
Britain and the US – though quarterly reporting has been avoided by some large 
German companies.47 
We therefore assume a broad similarity across the three countries in any 
pressure on companies with dispersed ownership, emanating from the stock market, to 
restrict spending on costly training programmes – and a contrasting lack of such 
pressure on other companies, particularly family-owned and unlisted ones. The 
difference may simply be that more companies are exposed to such pressures in 
Britain than in the other two countries. Moreover, during the past decade differences 
between Britain and Germany in terms of corporate governance and accounting 
practice have fallen markedly.48 
Initial training systems  
We take ‘apprenticeship’ to denote training programmes that combine vocational 
education with work-based learning, aimed at an intermediate occupational skill (i.e. 
more than routinised job training), and subject to externally imposed training 
standards, particularly for their workplace components. Evidence concerning 
apprenticeship has motivated the development of economic models of the supply and 
finance of training that focus on labour market factors.49 
                                                 
45 Grinyer et al (1998) find evidence of earnings management through R&D spending in British 
companies. Similarly, whether a company operates an R&D programme is sensitive to internal funding 
(cash flow) in Britain, but not in Germany, which suggests greater exposure to stock market pressures 
in Britain (Bond et al 1999). 
46 Leuz et al (2002), Leuz and Wüsterman (2004), Ben Otham and Zeghal (2006). Narrative reporting 
of non-financial indicators, including skills and training, is however more extensive in Germany than 
Britain, partly because of requirements for disclosure to Works Councils (PWC 2003). 
47 Nowak (2004), Noack and Zetzsche (2005), Baker and Barbu (2007), Volmer et al (2007). 
48 Höpner and Jackson (2006), Streeck (2009: chapter 6). 
49 Stevens (1994), Franz and Soskice (1995), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). 
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The three countries all possess a substantial amount of apprenticeship training. 
Germany and Switzerland occupy the top two places in international league tables of 
individual participation rates, with around two-thirds and three quarters of the youth 
population cohort respectively entering apprenticeship.50 By contrast, in England, the 
government hopes to raise the participation rate, based on a broad definition of 
apprenticeship, to one-fifth (DIUS 2008: 5). 
Measuring the scale of apprenticeship is straightforward for Germany and 
Switzerland, where national legislation defines apprenticeship and provides for the 
setting of high training standards. A weak statutory framework means that in Britain 
apprentices cannot be clearly distinguished from other trainees and employees.51 By 
default, the standard criterion is participation in the Apprenticeships programme, 
through which the government funds most work-based learning for young people. As 
the content of employers’ training programmes must conform to a ‘framework’ 
stipulated by a Sector Skills Council in order to receive public funding, the criterion is 
useful for counting ‘apprentices’ in Britain. 52 
Even so, as training standards vary greatly in Britain across frameworks, 
occupations and sectors, the question arises: how widely should the net be cast when 
counting Apprentices? The option chosen here is to include only Level 3 
(‘Advanced’) Apprentices, for which – in industrial occupations at least – skill 
standards are comparable to those in German and Swiss apprenticeship.53 
Table 2 shows the larger scale of operation of apprenticeship in Germany and 
Switzerland relative to Britain.54 Taking the economy as a whole, the number of 
apprentices amounts to 6.5 and 4.8 per cent of the number of employees in Germany 
and Switzerland respectively, but only 0.7 per cent in Britain. 
                                                 
50 The participation rate in Germany averaged around 67 per cent during 1992-2009, falling below 60 
per cent only in 2005 (BIBB 2010, Fig 2: 21); the Swiss rate averaged around 75 per cent during 1981-
2007, never falling below 70 per cent (SKBF/CSRE 2010, Fig 93: 143). 
51 Ryan et al (2007). The 2009 Apprenticeship Act focuses on the Apprenticeships programme rather 
than generic apprenticeship (Parliament 2009). 
52 Ryan et al (2007). 
53 Ryan and Unwin (2001), Steedman and Wagner (2003), Mason and Wagner (2005), Ryan et al 
(2007). The alternative is to include Level 2 Apprentices, but their training is typically aimed below 
intermediate (craft, technician) skill level, and most Apprentices, particularly at Level 2, receive little 
or no part-time vocational education in public colleges, a standard ingredient in the German and Swiss 
systems. 
54 Strictly speaking ‘England’, as the British establishments in our sample all operate primarily there 
(as in retailing) or entirely there (as in engineering). As Scotland and Northern Ireland operate their 
own public training programmes, our data for Britain refer mostly to England, either alone or in 
conjunction with Wales. 
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Table 2. Apprenticeship activity by country and sector 
   Number of 
apprentices 
Number of 
employees 
Apprentice-employee 
ratioa (%) 
   ('000) ('000)  Including Level 2 
GBb 2007 Whole economy 0,161.5c 23,073.0 0.7c 01.8 
  Engineering  0,034.5c,d 00,826.5e 5.9c 11.7 
  Retailing 0,014.2c,d 02,372.6 0.3c 01.7 
DE 2007 Whole economy 1,781.6 27,224.0 6.5 n.a. 
  Engineering  0,230.8 03,964.0 5.8 n.a. 
  Retailing 0,159.8 02,016.8 7.9 n.a. 
CH 2008 Whole economy 0,194.3 04,017.1 4.8 n.a. 
  Engineering  0,018.1 00,368.9 4.9 n.a. 
  Retailing 0,026.0 00,332.5 7.8 n.a. 
 
Sources: as in Ryan et al. (2010), Table 8. 
Notes. 
n.a.: not applicable. 
a. Employment is defined as excluding apprentices in all countries; 
b. England only; 
c. Advanced Apprenticeship (i.e., Level 3 programmes) only; 
d. Estimated on the assumptions that (i) the shares of different training frameworks in total participation 
are the same as in October 2004 and (ii) the breakdown between Level 2 and Level 3 Apprenticeship 
within frameworks is the same as that for programme leavers in 2004-05; 
e. ‘Employment jobs’ in scope to SEMTA, 2007. 
 
Does the same apply in engineering and retailing? International comparisons at 
sector level are complicated by mismatch between the occupation-based 
categorisation of training data and sector-based employment data, but that difficulty is 
not expected to differ greatly between the countries. In engineering, the apprentice 
ratio in Britain (5.9 per cent) is comparable to that in both Germany and Switzerland 
(5.8 and 4.9 per cent, respectively).55 The gap between training rates in Britain and the 
other two countries is however large in retailing: an apprentice ratio of nearly eight 
per cent in both Germany and Switzerland, as against only 0.3 per cent in Britain. The 
difference between England and the other countries reflects the widespread preference 
of English retailers for informal on-the-job training rather than apprenticeship. 
The national apprenticeship systems differ also in content. In both Germany 
and Switzerland, apprentices spend one to two days a week in formal education at a 
                                                 
55 The British ratio rises to 11.7 per cent if Level 2 Apprentices are included, but that figure is 
misleading, given the limited content of Level 2 programmes compared to apprenticeship in the other 
countries. Level 2 Apprenticeships resemble Anlehre and Attestausbildung  (‘elementary 
apprenticeship’) programmes for low achievers in Switzerland, taken by around 3 to 4 per cent of 
secondary-level graduates. 
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vocationa l college. In Britain, the same applies to engineering Apprentices, most of 
whom spend their first nine months entirely off the job, in colleges and training 
workshops, and subsequently attend a further education college on a part-time basis. 
But it does not apply to Apprentices in retailing. They inhabit one of the recently 
created training occupations in the service sector; they spend little time away from the 
immediate job; and they rarely receive any continuing education, vocational or 
general. 56 Their training actually resembles more the informal, staged training offered 
by larger retailers to recent recruits, which remains the predominant form of initial 
training in the sector (Lewis et al 2008).57 
Table 3. Cost of an apprenticeship to the employer (£K, 2000) 
  Occupation Duration 
(years) 
Gross 
cost 
Output 
during 
training 
Net 
cost 
Engineering GB Level 3 Apprenticeshipa  3.5 43.8 28.4 15.4 
 DE Mechatroniker 3.5 64.8 10.8 54.0 
 CH Polymechaniker 4.0 55.5 45.3 10.2 
Retailing GB Level 3 Apprenticeshipa 2.0 23.0 22.9 0.1 
 DE Kaufmann/fraub 3.0 30.4 16.0 14.4 
 CH Detailhandelsangesellter 3.0 27.7 30.2 -2.5 
 
Sources: Hogarth and Hasluck (2003: Tables 3.1, 5.2), Beicht et al (2004: 156-7), Mühlemann et al 
(2007: 55-60). 
Notes: 
Average across samples of employers; costs estimated on an average accounting cost (Vollkosten) 
basis; net cost is gross cost minus the estimated value of output during training. Converted to £K 
(2000) using the GDP price deflator (GB) and the mid-year sterling exchange rate. 
Years: GB, 2002; DE, 2000; CH, 2004. 
a. Excludes public training grants received by the employer 
b. Kaufmann/frau im Einzelhandel 
 
Finally, in engineering, apprenticeship training involves in all three countries 
substantial costs for the employer, as training regulations require apprentices to spend 
a substantial amount of time in part-time vocational education and learn a wide range 
of skills on the job. In retailing by contrast, a higher ratio of apprentice output during 
                                                 
56 One-third of all Apprentices (Levels 2 and 3 combined) claim to receive no off-the-job training. 
Time spent in off-the-job training averages between one and four hours per week in most service sector 
Apprenticeships, with Retailing and Customer Service at the one hour end of the spectrum (Ullman and 
Deakin 2005: 3, 15). 
57 The Apprenticeship programme differs from its Germanic counterparts also in centring on: (i) public 
subsidies to a range of training providers, many of them for-profit organisations; and (ii) contractual 
relationships and external inspection, rather than administrative hierarchy, social partnership and peer 
monitoring (Lewis and Ryan 2009, Ryan 2010). 
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training to pay means much lower costs to the employer on average in Germany, in 
Britain almost no net cost, and in Switzerland a modest surplus (Table 3).58 We 
therefore expect any effects of ownership on the supply of training to be stronger in 
engineering than in retailing. 
4. Sources of Evidence 
Our evidence concerns 56 establishments in engineering (i.e. metalworking) and 
retailing, in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. We targeted establishments and 
companies for inclusion with a view to matching them across the three countries by 
their products or services, as indicated by four-digit SIC codes, in order to hold 
broadly constant the influence of products and technologies on skills and training. We 
differentiated potential targets in terms of bargaining coverage and corporate 
ownership, the variables whose associations with skills and training are of specific 
interest. 
In engineering, the sample is dominated by producers of pumps, turbines, and 
compressors – sub-sectors for which comparable establishments could be identified in 
all three countries. In retailing, most companies are department stores or multiple 
outlet chains (in food, shoes, electronic products, and furniture). Most of the 
businesses are single establishments or groups of establishments (e.g. a regional 
division) within a large company. Several are owned by a foreign company, and some 
have the same multinational parent.59 
The distribution of initial training practice across cases is skewed. In Germany 
and Switzerland, all but one of the establishments operates an apprenticeship 
programme; in Britain, all of the engineering establishments, but none of the retailing 
establishments, do so.60 The British establishments all use in-house bespoke training 
programmes for newly hired sales staff. 
We sought to include a variety of types of corporate ownership, ranging from 
cooperatives through unlisted private companies, to listed companies with and without 
dispersed ownership – and in particular to include dispersed ownership companies in 
each sector-country category. That goal was attained only in part (Table 4). Less than 
                                                 
58 Table 3 excludes the two year (Verkäufer) programmes that operate in German and Swiss retailing. 
59 All of the engineering cases, but in retailing only the department stores, are single establishments. 
Statistical details are provided in Appendix A. 
60 Two of the British retailers actually offer Apprenticeships but only outside the establishment or 
region studied. 
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one quarter (12 out of 56) of our cases are listed companies with dispersed ownership. 
In the UK, the share is nearer to one half (eight out of 19), and in engineering slightly 
more than one half (five out of nine). But in the German and the Swiss samples only 
four companies have dispersed ownership, none of them in retailing. 
A breakdown of the ‘other’ category shows considerable heterogeneity: a 
predominance in all three countries of unlisted firms owned by a family, foundation or 
cooperative (26 cases), followed by listed firms with one or more large blockholders 
(13), along with a handful of unlisted firms owned by a small number of investors, 
including one British retailer financed partly by a private equity fund (Appendix 
Table A4). 
Table 4. Ownership of participating employers  
  GB DE CH All 
Engineering Listed, dispersed 05 01 03 09 
 Other 04 07 06 17 
 All 09 08 09 26 
Retailing Listed, dispersed 03 00 00 03 
 Other 07 10 10 27 
 All 10 10 10 30 
Both Listed, dispersed 08 01 03 12 
 Other 11 17 16 44 
 All 19 18 19 56 
 
Notes. 
‘Listed, dispersed’: the company (or its ultimate parent) company is listed on any stock market and no 
shareholder owns 20 per cent or more of its shares (with voting rights). 
 
The uneven distribution of the sample by ownership clearly reflects national 
attributes, and probably selection effects too. Dispersed ownership companies play a 
smaller role in Germany and Switzerland than in Britain (section three above). This 
appears to be particularly marked in retailing, where unlisted firms and family 
ownership dominate. But selection effects appear influential too. The refusal rate 
among target companies was highest in Britain, particularly among listed retailing 
companies with a recent history of financ ial upheaval, including leveraged buy-outs.61 
                                                 
61 Such companies proved particularly effective at frustrating our attempts to identify managers and 
contact them by phone, at both central and store levels. However, four listed British retailers agreed 
eventually to participate, two after we moved our request from head office to particular stores, and one 
through personal contacts. 
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Our information comes primarily from face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with senior managers. As the wider project focuses primarily on pay structure and 
training, our interviewees were typically managers of HR/personnel or training 
departments. We did not request interviews with a senior financial manager as well, as 
we expected that to jeopardise our targets’ willingness to participate. Our internally-
acquired information on financial factors comes therefo re from the perceptions of HR 
managers, concerning the effects of financial shocks, actual or hypothetical, on 
training decisions. We also met officials of employers’ associations and trade unions 
with interests in the relevant sector. 
The interviews were conducted between April 2008 and May 2009, during the 
recession that followed the international financial crisis. Information on ownership 
and financial upheavals was compiled primarily from public sources, including the 
company’s website and annual reports, and filings with regulatory authorities (notably 
Schedule 13G Filings for US-based companies).62 Further details are provided in the 
Appendix. 
5. Findings 
We use two types of evidence on the effects of finance and ownership on training. 
The first is association between ownership attributes and training – which, given that 
almost all employers except British retailers offer apprenticeship, concerns primarily 
the number of apprentices trained. The second source is the association that 
interviewees perceive between financial shocks and changes in training. 
We do not investigate separately the three factors discussed in section two, 
apart from documenting the incidence of dispersed ownership in our sample. 
Companies are not expected willingly to disclose details of their managerial payment 
systems and accounting practices. 
Interest focuses primarily on engineering, a sector in which an apprenticeship 
imposes substantial costs on the employer, and only secondarily on retailing, in which 
costs are at small, even negative (Table 3, above). 
                                                 
62 In all three countries, listed companies are required to publish the presence and identity of owners of 
stakes that exceed stipulated thresholds, starting at five per cent of total equity. 
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Ownership type and training intensity 
Do listed companies with dispersed ownership do more initial training than otherwise 
comparable companies? We compare companies’ current apprentice ratios (i.e. the 
ratio of apprentices to employees in the largest training occupations) across the two 
ownership categories. As the intensity of training is expected to vary by technology 
(as a determinant of skill requirements), we focus on differences within two four-digit 
engineering categories: pumps, and turbines and compressors. We define dispersion 
of ownership as the absence of any shareholder with at least 20 per cent of voting 
rights.63 
Table 5. Apprentice ratios in engineering subsectors by ownership and country 
(%) 
 All GB DE CH 
 Listed, dispersed Other 
Listed, 
dispersed Other 
Listed, 
dispersed Other 
Listed, 
dispersed Other 
(1) Pumps  2.1 08.8 2.1 9.0 - 6.9 - 11.1 
(2) Turbines, 
compressors  9.7 11.9 9.7 - 11.4 7.4 8.2 14.1 
(1) + (2) Both 7.2 09.6 5.9 9.0 11.4 7.0 8.2 12.3 
# firms (1) 2.0 09.0 2.0 2.0 00.0 4.0 0.0 03.0 
# firms (2 ) 4.0 02.0 2.0 0.0 01.0 1.0 1.0 02.0 
#(1)+#(2) 6.0 11.0 2.0 2.0 01.0 5.0 1.0 05.0 
 
Notes: 
Unweighted averages of companies’ ratio of stock of apprentices to employment (excluding 
apprentices) in production and maintenance departments, excluding the one (Swiss) company with no 
apprenticeships. 
Dash: not applicable (no case in category). 
 
Table 5 shows that the six listed engineering companies with dispersed 
ownership have lower training intensities than do the 11 ‘other’ ones: 2.1 per cent 
compared to 8.8 per cent in pumps, 9.7 per cent compared to 11.9 per cent in turbines 
and compressors.64 To that extent, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis. It is 
                                                 
63 If the threshold stake is reduced to 10 per cent, only one firm (a large British electrical retailer) 
moves from ‘dispersed’ to ‘other’, indicating that the classification is not sensitive to choice of 
threshold. 
64 The single (Swiss) engineering firm that does not train apprentices is excluded. 
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however complicated by the skewed distribution of ownership types across countries: 
our Swiss and German samples have only no ‘listed, dispersed’ cases in pumps and 
only one each in turbines; the British sample, no ‘listed dispersed’ case in turbines. 
Any ownership effects on training may therefore be proxies for national effects. 
The most informative evidence is that for the British pump companies, with 
two cases in each ownership category, and each pair comprising one producer of 
smaller pumps in larger batches and one producer of larger pumps in smaller batches. 
The considerable difference in training intensity by ownership (2.1 compared to 9.0 
per cent) is again consistent with the hypothesis of ownership effects on training, and 
it is not polluted by any country-specific effects. 
A further comparison becomes viable using the data in Table 5 if differences 
between Germany and Switzerland in national training-related factors are taken to be 
small – as might be expected from a ‘varieties of capitalism’ standpoint. The five 
German and Swiss turbine firms comprise three with dispersed ownership and two 
‘others’. Training intensity averages 9.8 per cent for the two dispersed ownership 
cases, as compared to 11.9 for the three ‘others’. The difference, albeit modest, is also 
consistent with the hypothesised ownership effects. 
Differences across companies are substantial, and even suggest that ‘company’ 
effects may dominate ownership effects. The two establishments in each of the British 
and German samples that have the highest apprentice ratios, taking pumps, turbines 
and compressors as a whole, are owned by the same two multinationals. The 
similarity of these plants’ training efforts is not however mirrored in their parents’ 
ownership structures: both are listed companies, but one has dispersed ownership 
(largest stake well below 10 per cent), while the other has a dominant block-holder 
(more than 25 per cent). 
This analysis cannot be extended to retailing, given the absence of 
apprenticeship in the British sample and of dispersed ownership in the German and 
Swiss ones. What can be said is that the evidence suggests no ownership effect in 
British retailing: despite low training costs, none of the British retailers, not even a 
cooperative department store chain with a strong reputation for training, provides 
Apprenticeships. This aspect of British training practice appears to be independent of 
corporate ownership. 
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Financial shocks and training 
The second source of evidence on ownership effects is the link between financial 
upheaval and training. Section two discussed evidence that earnings management is 
encountered frequently in listed companies that in its absence would miss earnings 
targets, including breaking even and meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts. Financial 
shocks tend to generate such situations. We therefore asked interviewees about any 
substantial recent financial upheavals in their companies, including those that we had 
already identified from public sources. When none had occurred we asked about a 
hypothetical takeover by a private equity fund. 
Taking actual upheavals first, two issues arise. First, have listed companies 
with dispersed ownership experienced more financial upheavals than have other 
companies? Second, to what extent have those upheavals affected training decisions? 
We distinguish two broad categories of financial upheaval: a major fall in the 
company’s stock price, and any substantial change in ownership the establishment had 
experienced in recent years, including a change of dominant owner or a large external 
investment.65 Such events feature moderately frequently (Table 6). Almost one half of 
participating companies (27 out of 56) have experienced at least one financial 
upheaval. The incidence is particularly high in Britain, at around two-thirds (13 out of 
19), as compared to less than one-third (five out of 18) in Germany and around one 
half in Switzerland (nine out of 19). Ownership change features more often than a fall 
in share price. 
Differences between countries result at least partly from ownership attributes 
(Table 7). Financial upheaval is the norm among participating companies with 
dispersed ownership: only one has not recently had such an experience. By contrast, 
only one-third (14 out of 42) in the ‘other’ category report a financial upheaval.66 
Dispersed ownership companies report a share price fall more often than do ‘others’ – 
which is hardly surprising, given that only a minority of the latter have a share price 
(i.e. are listed). Less obvious ex ante is the substantial incidence of changes in 
ownership among ‘other’ companies, with one half (six out of 10) ‘other’ companies 
in Britain experiencing such an event (Table 8). The substantial incidence of financial 
                                                 
65 The distinction between financial and other upheavals in our evidence is not sharp. In several cases, 
weak performance in product markets preceded financial upheaval. 
66 Reporting bias may be present here, insofar as the dominant source of our information for unlisted 
companies are interviewees themselves, whereas more published information is available for listed 
companies. 
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upheaval in Switzerland applies primarily to engineering, reflecting the past decade’s 
extensive restructuring. 67 
Table 6. Incidence of financial upheaval in engineering and retailing companies 
 UK DE CH All 
(1) Fall in share  price 7 2 4 13 
(2) Ownership: takeover, merger/demerger, etc. 10 4 7 21 
Either (1) or (2) 13 5 9 27 
Both (1) and (2) 5 1 2 8 
Number of companies 19 18 19 56 
 
Note. 
Occurrence during the past decade (in some cases, two decades) for the company of (i) a substantial (as 
judged by the interviewer or the interviewee) fall in the (parent) company’s share price, or (ii) a change 
of owner, through takeover, merger (or demerger), change of large owner, or large external investment 
(excluding acquisitions of other companies). 
 
Table 7. Incidence of financial upheaval by ownership and country 
 GB DE CH All countries 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Listed, dispersed 8 1 2 0 3 0 13 1 
Other 5 5 3 13 6 10 14 28 
All companies 13 6 5 13 9 10 27 28 
 
Note: 
Yes (no): occurrence of at least one (no) financial shock in company 
55 companies for which information was available 
 
Table 8. Incidents of financial upheaval by ownership category and country 
 GB DE CH All countries 
 Merger Share price Merger 
Share 
price Merger 
Share 
price Merger 
Share 
price 
Listed, 
dispersed 
4 6 1 1 2 2 7 9 
Other 6 1 3 1 6 3 15 5 
All companies 10 7 4 2 8 5 22 14 
 
Notes: 
Only companies with (one or more) financial shocks; some companies appear in both categories of 
shock. 
‘Merger’: the company was merged into or taken over by another company or had a change of majority 
ownership; its own acquisitions are not included 
                                                 
67 Engineering accounts for seven out of the nine Swiss companies with financial upheaval. 
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What effect do these financ ial changes have on training? We consider the issue 
first for all financial upheavals and second for the subset of shocks that involve a 
move between the ‘listed, dispersed’ and ‘other’ categories. 
Table 9 shows that financially- induced retrenchment of training is not 
widespread in our sample. It has occurred in only seven companies, in five of which 
the cuts involved initial training, and in the other two, continuing training. Financial 
upheavals affect training, for better or worse, somewhat more often in Britain (eight  
out of 13 cases) than in the other countries (six out of 14 cases). The extreme case is a 
small Swiss engineering company, which abandoned its apprenticeship programme in 
the aftermath of its takeover by a multinational. Type of ownership does not however 
appear to be involved, as the change was one closely held firm (family-based 
foundation) to another (foreign family), which is also based in a country with an 
extensive apprenticeship system. 
Table 9. Effects of financial upheaval on training in participating companies 
Effect   UK DE CH All 
Initial training Less 4 0 1 5 
 More 5 0 0 5 
Other training Less 1 0 1 2 
 More 1 1 1 3 
HR centralisation  2 0 0 2 
Other  1 0 0 1 
None  5 1 6 12 
No information  0 3 0 3 
All   13 5 9 27 
 
Note: 
Effect on training: judgement by interviewee(s). Initial training: apprenticeship or other initial training. 
Data are confined to cases for which information was obtained. Cases in which training was cut as a 
result of a fall in expected future requirements for skilled labour are not included. 
 
Cutbacks in training, whether in initial or continuing training, in quantity or 
content, that are linked to a financial upheaval are present mostly among the British 
companies – and, paradoxically, more in retailing than in engineering. Again, interest 
focuses primarily on apprenticeship training in engineering companies with dispersed 
ownership. Given the external regulation of training standards in all three countries, 
employers’ choices concern the volume more than the content of training. Of the ten 
establishments (in six companies) in this category, nine report having had one or more 
financial upheavals. However, in only one did a financial shock affect apprentice 
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training significantly: a profitability crisis 15 years ago that caused the intake of 
apprentices to be suspended.68 Even that instance has limited weight, as the resulting 
imbalance in the age and skill structure of the company’s workforce meant that in the 
two subsequent shocks the apprenticeship programme remained unaffected.69 
Otherwise any effects reported are secondary – such as the recent postponement by a 
German pumps company of a planned refurbishment of its training centre, and the 
bringing in-house by a British engineering company of the Key Skills component of 
its Apprenticeship programme. 
By contrast, the three British retailers that are listed companies with dispersed 
ownership have all experienced one or more sharp falls in their stock price, to which 
all responded with cutbacks. Those cuts involve  the content of (non-Apprenticeship) 
training: the amount of that type of training that retailers undertake depends directly 
on the labour turnover rate that they experience in sales occupations. The strongest 
response came from a retailer of electrical and electronic goods, which, in response to 
a recent drastic fall in profits and share price, reduced the content of training for store 
managers and sales staff, and converted training for sales staff from personal 
instruction by the store manager to self- instruction using in-store IT equipment. The 
HR manager anticipated adverse effects on training quality from both changes. 
In response to similar difficulties, a second company reduced the duration of 
initial training for sales staff from three days to two, while trying to strengthen the 
link between training and customer service, to give staff the skills and motivation to 
sell more. The third company cut off-the-job training for managers, which was seen as 
relatively expensive and of questionable efficacy. In all three cases, interviewees saw 
a conflict between financial pressures for cost reduction and a competitive need to 
maintain customer service through staff training. These cases suggest that in dispersed 
ownership companies even short, low cost training programmes can be prone to cuts 
as a result of cost pressure in a crisis. 
Broader repercussions were reported in two other cases, both in Britain, in 
which the HR/personnel function was restructured. An engineering company not only 
centralised HR management from plant to company level, but also made the plant’s 
                                                 
68 The pattern would change were training cuts associated with employment reduction included. The 
three engineering companies that reported such episodes were all dispersed ownership companies at the 
time of the cuts. 
69 A similar experience and response was reported by a large Swiss engineering plant with a dominant 
blockholder (its CEO). 
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apprenticeship manager compulsorily redundant, a move that was seen as endangering 
training quality. 
Not only are changes in training in response to financial shock a minority 
experience in our sample, in eight cases the perceived effect on training is expansion, 
not contraction. The scenario typically involves a crisis- induced review of the 
company’s activities, leading to the reformulation of corporate strategy based around 
the quality of products or services, and with more training and skills viewed as 
necessary for success. 
Finally, changes in ownership may have effects on training. Five companies 
changed (in either direction) between ‘listed, dispersed ownership’ and ‘other’ status. 
Three moved from listed, dispersed status: one engineering plant and two department 
stores, all in Britain. The engineering company reported that its new, foreign owner 
had not – at least not yet – attempted to influence its training decisions. The two 
retailers saw the change to private ownership by a hands-on individual as making 
possible their recent increases in spending on training – consistent with the 
hypothesised ownership effect. 
The two companies that moved to dispersed ownership were engineering 
companies, one British, the other Swiss. No adverse effect on the apprenticeship 
programme was perceived in either case. Managers attribute that in both cases to a 
high priority to skills and training on the part of the new owners, both of them multi-
nationals – dispersed ownership notwithstanding. These cases do not support the 
hypothesised ownership effect. Nevertheless, in the Swiss case, the HR manager 
would have expected adverse effects had the share offering been taken up by an 
organisation intent on short-term financial gain, notably a private equity fund. A 
similar concern is stated in two further Swiss engineering companies whose 
ownership has been in flux. Their concerns may reflect the potential threat to the 
interviewees’ own jobs, but training and skills could well have been jeopardised by a 
move to that particular type of dispersed ownership. 
Hypothetical sale to private equity 
Managers’ views on the effects of a hypothetical sale to private equity were mixed. 70 
Some managers of British companies had personal knowledge of such events in 
                                                 
70 The threat posed by external takeover was formulated in terms of private equity for its dramatic 
potential, despite the marginal status of the threat in Germany and Switzerland, and the possibility that 
private equity funds have less short-term horizons than does mainstream dispersed ownership. 
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competitor firms. A manager in a department store owned by an employee trust 
remarked that ‘if we had to react in the way that some other retailers do to shareholder 
pressure, we would not be in the long term business that we are ... we’re not subject to 
the same pressures’. Her counterpart in another privately owned company said 
however, ‘it’s hard to say .... some private equity funds have a long-term view.’ Also 
valuable are the statements of a food retailer and a shoe retailer, both of whom had 
experience of private equity funding, the first by acquiring a company from such a 
fund, the second by having a fund invest in it. Neither change was seen as having any 
visible effect on training. 
In Germany, two companies – an engineering one owned by a foundation and 
an electronics retailer owned by a family – stated that their low debt burden and high 
rate of re- investment of profits are both made possible by their ownership structure, 
and could not be expected to continue were private equity in charge, with potentially 
adverse implications for training. On the other hand, two Swiss retailing companies 
thought that an increase in apprenticeship training would be on the cards, as in their 
sector apprentices earn money for their employers, and a private equity concern could 
be expected to exploit that advantage more extensively. 
Overall, of the 32 firms that gave a view on the issue, 14 would expect no 
effect, 15 would expect cuts in training, and the two Swiss retailers would expect an 
increase. 
Product market competition 
Product markets may be more important influences on skills and training than are 
financial markets. Although some theories predict that greater competition between 
companies in product markets leads under particular conditions to less training, 
statistical evidence does not support that proposition. 71 Moreover, companies’ training 
efforts have been found to depend positively on product competition (importance of 
quality) and inversely on product diversity and batch size, while financial factors 
influence primarily the type of training used (apprenticeship as opposed to upgrade).72 
Our evidence also goes against any expectation that competition reduces 
training. Most interviewees describe competition in the company’s product market(s) 
as strong; almost all of those who responded to the question also see product market 
                                                 
71 Miller (1997), Görlitz and Stiebale (2008). Adverse effects on training are predicted when any firms 
that provide general training are required by exo genous pay structure to invest in trainees. 
72 Backes-Gellner (1996). 
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competition as supporting spending on training. That view is particularly marked in 
retailing (Table 10), where most companies see a high standard of customer service as 
essential for competitive advantage, and training in sales skills and product 
knowledge as essential for good customer service. Particularly striking is a privately 
owned German discount food retailer, whose initial business model had involved low 
service and low prices. It now gives priority to broadening its range of products and 
improving customer service, and it has raised pay for apprentices in order to attract 
better applicants. 
Table 10. Product market competition and training 
Number of companies answering ‘yes’/number of companies for which information 
was obtained 
  
Company faces strong 
competition in product 
market 
Product market 
competition has a strongly 
positive effect on training 
Engineering UK 4/8 6/7 
 Germany 3/8 2/5 
 Switzerland 4/9 7/8 
Retailing UK 8/10 9/10 
 Germany 9/10 5/5 
 Switzerland 9/10 6/10 
Both All 37/55 35/45 
 
The situation in engineering is broadly similar, insofar as all of the companies 
produce at least some bespoke products, as one-offs or small batches, and design, 
sales, and after-sales service, which account typically for an increasing share of 
revenues, involve high levels of customer contact, for which both technical and social 
skills are important. At the same time, as these engineering companies specia lise more 
by detailed product and face less intensive price competition than do retailers, it is 
perhaps not surprising that, in Germany at least, they less often rate product market 
competition and its effects on training as strong. 
The difference between the two sectors is however less marked in British and 
Swiss than in German engineering, suggesting a more precarious situation among 
British and Swiss than among German engineering firms. 
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6. Conclusions  
This paper has outlined the conditions under which corporate ownership and finance 
may be expected to influence a firm’s supply of training. Our analysis is formulated in 
terms of three interdependent factors: listed status with dispersed ownership, highly 
geared incentive pay for managers, and accounting conventions and stock market 
myopia. The managers of ‘stock market firms’ whose pay depends strongly on 
reported earnings or the company’s share price have incentives to hold down spending 
on intangible assets in order to increase their own remuneration. In closely held firms, 
by contrast, managers’ decisions are subject to direct monitoring by owners, who have 
less interest in offering their managers highly geared bonus pay, and are better placed 
to perceive the long-term interest of the firm and give it priority over short-term 
benefits. 
The effects of corporate ownership are expected to be particularly strong for 
training programmes that impose on the employer a high cost per trainee – as for 
apprenticeship training in engineering skills. Even in such a context, however, the 
difference between the two types of firm may be weak or absent. Managerial ‘self-
dealing’ may be curbed by effective corporate governance, by investor cooperation 
and activism, by a limited use of performance-related payment for managers, and by 
an ability among even arms- length investors to see behind current reported earnings in 
valuing the business. Moreover, earnings management may focus more on smoothing 
reported profits over time than on maximising their current magnitude – in which case 
its implications for training become more a matter of durable restriction rather than 
short-termist manipulation. 
Our evidence, taken from a project focused principally on the labour market 
aspects of initial training, is consistent with the proposition that, in engineering at 
least, listed companies with dispersed ownership do less training in normal times than 
do matched plants with other kinds of ownership, including listed firms with block-
holder ownership and privately owned firms. Second, dispersed ownership companies 
are more prone to financial upheaval, defined in terms of ownership changes and falls 
in share prices, than are other types of company. We encountered some firms in which 
such financial changes had led to cutbacks in training – primarily in Britain, and, 
surprisingly, more often in retailing than in engineering. 
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We do not find, however, that financial upheaval has generally adverse effects 
on initial training. Indeed, when associated with a new start for an ailing business, it 
can mean the expansion of or improvement in training, not budget cuts and 
retrenchment. In this respect, the requirements of product markets provide some 
buoyancy to corporate training efforts, even in listed companies with dispersed 
ownership in British engineering, in which apprenticeship training is particularly 
costly for the employer. 
Our evidence comes from only a limited number of companies, whose 
representativeness is uncertain. It lacks controls for such potential influences on 
training as future requirements for skilled labour and the cost of potential substitutes 
for initial training, notably recruitment and upgrade training. As the strength of 
ownership effects appears to be limited, larger and more representative datasets are 
needed if more definitive evidence is to be found. 
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Appendix 1. Research methods and establishment attributes 
Our engineering cases are chosen from national listings of British and Swiss 
establishments by four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, as 
compiled by Dun and Bradstreet. That source shows for pumps, turbines and 
compressors significant numbers of medium-sized establishments (broadly speaking, 
between 100 and 700 employees) in both countries. We identified comparable 
German producers from various German sources, including the directory Wer Liefert 
Was?, concentrating the German search on four regions: Berlin, the Ruhr, Baden-
Württemberg, and Hamburg. Although we did not seek specifically to include 
establishments located in the former DDR, two of the Berlin-based retailing 
establishments are located there. The inclusion of additional subsectors in both 
engineering and retailing resulted from the need to include German companies that 
are not covered by collective bargaining (ohne Tarifbindung), none of which could be 
located in the core subsectors. Although we did not specifically seek only 
establishments that provide apprenticeship training, our sample comprises almost 
entirely those that do – with important exception of British retailing, in which none of 
the stores or divisions in our sample operates an Apprenticeship programme. 
Table A1 shows the distribution of interviewed establishments across 
subsectors. These sectors account for around 0.5 per cent (engineering) and between 
2.8 and 5.4 per cent (retailing, in Switzerland and Britain respectively) of total 
employment in the three countries. The data refer in engineering mostly to middle 
sized establishments owned by large companies, and in retailing mostly to groups of 
small to medium sized stores, most of them part of large national retail chains (Table 
A2). 
Eighteen of the establishments are the subsidiary of a parent company shared 
with one or more establishments in the other countries. Most are simple pairs, whether 
German/British or German/Swiss; one group involves four establishments in a single 
large company, spread across the three countries. Most of the paired establishments 
are in engineering (Table A3). 
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Table A1. Number of participating establishments by sector 
Sector Subsector SIC 
1987 
GB DE CH All 
Engineering Pumps and pumping equipment 3561 4 4 4 12 
 Turbines and turbine generator sets 3511 1 2 2 5 
 Air and gas compressors  3563 0 0 1 1 
 Aircraft engines and parts 3724 1 0 0 1 
 Electronic components, n.e.c. 3679 3 2 2 7 
 All engineering subsectors   9 8 9 26 
       
Retailing Department stores 5311 4 2 3 9 
 Grocery storesa 5411 3 3 2 8 
 Shoe storesa 5661 1 2 2 5 
 Furniture storesa 5712 1 1 1 3 
 Radio, TV and electronics storesa 5731 1 2 2 5 
 All retailing subsectors   10 10 10 30 
       
Both     19 18 19 56 
 
Note: 
a. Groups of stores, typically at regional (division) or national (company) level 
 
Table A2. Employment and training in participating establishments 
  Engineering  Retailing 
  GB DE CH GB DE CH 
Employment Median  377 500 308 1334 3348 333 
 Mean  1739 2959 288 37650 12957 2406 
 Share (%)a 4.2 10.5 11.2 45.7 42.4 42.8 
Apprentices Mean 27 68 39 0b 598 155 
 
Note: participating establishments comprise single ones in engineering and, in retailing, both single 
establishments (department stores) and groups of establishments (divisions, regions and companies). 
a. Share of total employment in parent company or group 
b. Sales trainees only (no Apprentices) 
 
Table A3. Establishments with the same multi-national parent company 
 GB/DE DE/CH GB/DE/CH All 
Engineering 2 3 1 6 
Retailing 1 1 0 2 
Number of establishments 6 8 4 18 
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Table A4. Participating companies by detailed ownership category, sector and 
country 
 Engineering Retailing All 
 GB DE CH GB DE CH  
Listed, dispersed ownership 5 1 3 3 0 0 12 
Listed, blockholder(s) 2 4 2 0 3 2 13 
Unlisted: family, foundation, coop 1 2 4 5 7 7 26 
Unlisted: investor group 1 1 0 2 0 1 5 
All 9 8 9 10 10 10 56 
 
Companies that declined to participate were replaced by comparable ones until a full 
set of interviews had been obtained. The participation rate among companies 
approached was 79 per cent in Switzerland, 60 per cent in Germany, and 43 per cent 
in England. It is likely that our sample is implicitly selected towards (i) larger parent 
companies and (ii) bigger and better apprentice training programmes. Selection bias is 
least troubling for Swiss engineering, in which the response rate is high and sample 
size is close to population size. 
Most interviews were conducted by two or three members of the research 
team; a handful, by one or by all four. A team member based in the establishment’s 
own country was present in all cases. The interviews, which lasted around 1.5 hours 
on average, were conducted around a detailed questionnaire, the content of whose 
English and German language versions was close. Some interviews in Germany and 
Switzerland were conducted in English. A short (two page) statistically-oriented 
excerpt was sent to interviewees to complete in advance. In a few cases some key data 
could not be obtained. 
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Appendix 2. Distribution of company types in national data 
Table A5. Distribution of companies by ownership and country 
Share of all companies in category 
  Corporate form   
  AG/ 
PLCa 
GmbH/ 
Ltdb 
Co- 
operativec 
Otherd All 
No. of 
companies 
All sectors  GB 0.1 93.1 4.0 2.9 100.0 2,444,687 
 DE 0.2 14.6 0.2 85.0 100.0 3,140,509 
 CH 27.8 15.0 0.7 56.5 100.0 298,722 
Engineering GB 1.0 98.7 0.1 0.2 100.0 45,485 
 DE 0.8 42.3 0.0 56.9 100.0 24,738 
 CH 56.8 12.5 0.0 30.7 100.0 3,406 
Retailing GB 0.3 99.0 0.5 0.2 100.0 190,634 
 DE 0.1 15.8 0.1 83.9 100.0 699,980 
 CH 30.9 16.1 0.8 52.2 100.0 68,830 
 
Sources. UK. FAME dataset (BvDEP 2009). DE: Statistisches Bundesamt (2007), 
Umsatzsteuerstatistik 2007. Steuerpflichtige und deren Lieferungen und Leistungen 2007 nach 
Rechtsformen, VID/37331100. CH: Bundesamt für Statistik (2007), Marktwirtschaftliche Unternehmen 
nach Wirtschaftsabteilungen und Rechtsform, 2005 
Notes. 
a. Public company, listed or unlisted; includes Aktiengesellschaft (DE, CH) and PLC (UK) 
b. Private company; includes Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (DE, CH) and Limited company 
(UK) 
c. Includes in UK Industrial/Provident Associations and Companies Limited by Guarantee 
d. In DE, Einzelgesellschaften, Kommanditgesellschaften, Betrieb gewerblicher Art. von Körperschaft 
des öffentlichen Rechts, sonstige Rechtsform; in CH, Einzelfirmen, Kollektivgesellschaften, 
Kommanditgesellschaften, Andere; in UK, unlimited liability companies and partnerships. 
 
Table A6. Distribution of number of businesses and turnover by business type 
and sector, private non-farm business, Switzerland, 2007 (%) 
  
Machinery 
Manufacture 
(DK29) 
Retailing 
(DK52) 
All sectors 
  Number Turnover Number Turnover Number Turnover 
AG PLC 0.8 17.0 0.1 12.6 0.2 19.1 
GmbH Limited 
company 
43.4 44.1 10.3 18.3 14.6 35.7 
Komanditgesellschaft Partnershipa 13.5 31.8 2.7 35.4 4.2 23.4 
Genossenschaft Cooperative n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2 1.1 
Einzelunternehmen Sole trader 36.4 3.0 80.3 25.5 70.3 10.2 
Andere Other 5.8 4.1 6.6 8.2 10.5 10.5 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Totals  24,738 €212,858K 403,466 €460,789K 3,140,509 €5,148,264K 
 
Source: Statistiches Bundesamt, Umsatzsteuerstatistik  (VID/37331 100) 
Notes: 
Businesses with tax liability and turnover of at least €17,500 p.a.; turnover measured after sales taxes 
n.a: data not released 
a. Limited partnerships only 
